russia invade georgia
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On August 8, 2008, Russian forces began the invasion of Georgia, marking the start of Europe’s first twenty-first century war. The conflict itself was over within a matter of days, but the repercussions of the Russo-Georgian War continue to reverberate thirteen years on, shaping the wider geopolitical environment.
The international reaction to Russia’s military campaign in Georgia was to prove remarkably muted, with Moscow suffering few negative consequences. On the contrary, EU leaders led calls for a ceasefire that appeared to favor Russian interests, while the US under the new Obama administration was soon calling for a reset in relations with the Kremlin.
Understandably, many in Moscow interpreted this accommodating approach as an informal invitation for further acts of aggression in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Six years after the Russo-Georgian War, Russia embarked on a far more comprehensive military campaign against Ukraine, where Moscow continues to occupy Crimea and large swathes of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
John Herbst, Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council:
Thirteen years ago, Europe experienced major power aggression for the first time since Hitler’s defeat in 1945. Russian troops attacked and defeated Georgian forces in a short war that Moscow and its proxies in South Ossetia provoked. The reaction of the West was slow and weak. French President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated ceasefire terms that Moscow largely violated without consequence. The Kremlin learned that the West preferred to ignore or at least minimize Russian bad behavior in the so-called Near Abroad.
Moscow applies this lesson in Georgia today as it regularly moves the demarcation line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia a few meters further into the country. Russia also applied the lessons of 2008 in Crimea and Donbas. It took the West some time, and the July 2014 shooting down of the MH17 passenger airliner, to impose serious sanctions on Moscow for its aggression in Ukraine.
Matthew Bryza, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council:
The weak international response to Russia’s invasion of Georgia greenlighted Russia’s subsequent military assault on Ukraine.
Many senior officials of transatlantic governments with whom I worked to mediate the conflicts over Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia condemned Russia’s invasion, but also blamed then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for provoking Vladimir Putin.
Hence, the ceasefire agreement brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy was one-sided in favor of Moscow, while the subsequent EU report about the five-day war (incorrectly) blamed Georgia for firing the first shots. Later in 2008, Paris announced plans to sell Russia a Mistral-class helicopter carrier, prompting a Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff to declare how much easier it would have been to defeat Georgia with the ship already in Russia’s arsenal.
Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council:
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia brought the West’s relations with Russia to their lowest point since the 1980s. Coming less than six months after NATO’s Bucharest Summit, which had declared that Georgia and Ukraine would be NATO members one day, the invasion was a direct challenge to both countries’ right to choose a Euro-Atlantic future.
The invasion of Georgia should have been a wake-up call to the international community, a clear signal that Western efforts since the fall of the Berlin Wall to integrate Russia in a collective security framework had failed. Yet a year later, the US and its allies decided to try again, to “reset” relations with Moscow, and to continue to treat Russia as a strategic partner rather than an adversary.
Only after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the launch of Moscow’s hybrid war in eastern Ukraine did the West finally acknowledge that Putin’s Russia had become a revisionist power seeking to reestablish its dominion over the eastern half of Europe. We can only speculate whether a firmer and more clear-eyed Western response in 2008 could have prevented the tragic events of 2014.
Daniel Fried, Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council:
Putin wanted the war. In the summer of 2008, he kept provoking then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili until, against US advice, Saakashvili gave the order for Georgian forces to push back Russian-controlled South Ossetian forces that were shelling Georgian villages. The Russian army, prepared and with its pretext in hand, crossed into Georgia in strength.
The Georgian army held out for two days, but on the third day its lines broke and it retreated toward Tbilisi. The Russians advanced but, with the Georgian army prepared to fight for the capital, stopped short. French President Nicolas Sarkozy then negotiated a flawed ceasefire. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice flew to France and Georgia with fighting still flaring, worked out corrections to the ceasefire, and obtained Saakashvili’s signature.
NATO’s 13 years of strategic patience while under attack from Russian hybrid warfare has allowed Russia to advance its strategic goal.
The Western world was not able to prevent Russian aggression in 2008 but was quick to react. The Bush administration was resolute in its desire to protect Georgia’s sovereignty and not to allow the Kremlin to destroy Georgian democracy. The U.S. response included a military component. France, then holder of the EU presidency, stepped in to mediate a ceasefire agreement.
These efforts together with significant financial assistance (including a $1bn U.S. grant) were sufficient to save Georgia’s statehood but not enough to deter Russia from its continuing campaign to wage hybrid war against the idea of a Europe whole, free and at peace. And while Georgian statehood is secure, Russian troops remain in the occupied regions.
It is crucial that the EU beefs-up its presence in South Caucasus more broadly, particularly on security and conflict related issues, write Amanda Paul and Iana Maisuradze in an analysis of the situation in Georgia 13 years after the 2008 war which depleted the country of 20% of its territory.
Human rights have also been in free fall, with numerous human rights violations happening on daily basis. International access to the occupied territories continues to be denied to international human rights monitors and humanitarian assistance. The European Union (EU) Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is unable to properly carry out its mandate as it is prevented from entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Beyond toothless statements, the international community – not least the EU and US – has failed to challenge Russia for its non-compliance and ongoing occupation. This gives the impression that they can live with the status quo. The Geneva International Discussions (GID), which bring together Georgian, Russian, Abkhaz, South Ossetian, and US participants under the co-chairmanship of the EU, the UN and the OSCE, have become an instrument to manage rather than resolve the conflicts. Consequently, Russia has felt emboldened.
What should be done?
Georgia is on the frontline in Russia’s war against democratic values and the liberal world order. The transatlantic community must stand behind its verbal support for Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The EU/US must make it clear to Russia that it needs to meet its international obligation or face sanctions, not only for the non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement but also for the human rights violations it has committed, as recently judged by European Court of Human Rights. Those individuals responsible for the killings and arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens must be held accountable. Russia and the de facto authorities must also release all detained civilians.
Russia should also be urged to reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as so-called independent states and to restore movement and access to emergency medical care across the ABL.
There should be a reestablishment of an OSCE field presence in Georgia which is able to operate unopposed across the ABL. It is crucial to reducing tensions and offering support for local populations on both sides of the ABL.
When Russia Invaded Georgia
Long before its conventional assault on Georgia, Russia openly backed separatist militants, launched cyberattacks, and used disinformation to meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Initial intelligence reports of Russian forces entering Georgian territory didn’t even cause enough concern to order Georgian military officials back from their holidays. Though Moscow had long attempted to thwart Georgia’s turn to the West, Russia had not launched a conventional military attack on a neighboring country since it invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
But in August 2008, under the auspices of “securing” the separatist enclave, Russia invaded my country. To say the Kremlin uses disproportionate force is an understatement: Russia bombed Georgian positions with more than 200 aircraft, while the Georgian air force had fewer than a dozen combat aircraft in service. Some 80,000 Russian land troops deployed to Georgia; our entire army stood at less than 30,000.
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Russian military operations also were not confined to South Ossetia. Russian armed forces advanced toward Georgia’s capital. Georgian troops, who resisted with a fierceness the Russians had not expected, held off their march to Tbilisi.
In the days that followed, the international community played a critical role in halting the Russian offensive. The Bush administration notably sent a “humanitarian convoy” to Georgia, deterring further aggression with cruise-missile-armed warships and military aircraft.
